SUPER 15 FINAL: THE HURRICANES VS THE HIGHLANDERS

Let’s start with a broad generalization and say that the Hurricanes thought that more of the same was all they needed to win the game.

Highlanders’ Pattern of Play

The Highlanders at one stage in the season seemed to be going down the same road. The turning point for them was the Invercargill game against the Chiefs. The guts of their win there was in getting points ahead, with some adventure but once ahead they played to win.

The priority became field position with a good chase pattern and an equally good receipt pattern in case there was a return kick. Once they had field position they could commit to regaining possession by having a good crack at the ball. Not entirely with impunity but they could tempt the ref’s whistle with the consequence being a lineout. And, as we saw in the final, doing your homework at the lineout makes their throw in less than a forgone conclusion.

Add to field position and possession, pace and you have the initial ingredients of a win.

The best example of this was the delay by the Highlanders when they were positioning for the drop goal. The Hurricanes couldn’t risk getting offside but the longer the Highlanders kept the ball the more the clock did its job.

Now add patience to remain in control of the ball and you begin to force the opposition to play catch up rugby beyond their skill set.

This is not to say that the Hurricanes didn’t have the skill set, they have shown it in spades during the season.

But, in a game like this, it is small margins that make all the difference.

Reloading

The most common of these when you are playing gain line rugby is the ability to reload in both attack and defence.

By this I mean, given that the gain line is now the tackle line, that the team that gains an advantage in attack and defence over the gain line creates momentum in attack to eventually penetrate and the start of a dominant tackle in defence, from which possession can be regained.

Both teams were guilty of not reloading every time but the Hurricanes more than the Highlanders.

What do I mean by reloading? Quite simply it is the discipline to re-align far enough back in sufficient time to move forward when the ball is out. As you would appreciate this occurs in phase plays that far outweigh the number of set pieces, highlighting the importance of reloading.

In attack it means the players are moving into the pass at pace threatening the defence with power, speed and evasion.

In defence it is moving into the tackle. From phase play it is 2-4 metres behind the offside line. To be on the offside line puts the tackler at a disadvantage as to move forward means they are offside. If they want to avoid this they have to hold their ground, remaining stationary, conceding momentum to the attack. The trap the defence can fall into is just retreating to the hindmost foot once the attack has gained some metres over the gain line.

So while this didn’t happen all the time the Highlanders were able to move into the tackle from phase play inside the Hurricanes’ half building on field position.

Hurricanes Kicking Game?

Add to this the reluctance of the Hurricanes to kick for field position or work their way into a position where they would have created space to kick into and the problem is compounded. As a result they were trying to score from too far out. And when your kicker misses penalties that would have kept you in touch and you are in trouble.

Hurricanes’ Support Play

I mentioned that it was a game of small margins and the Hurricanes support play fell into a small trap.

All season they had been able to make “50/50” passes, the ones that lead to turnovers in most teams. But in the Hurricanes’ case they made a breakthrough. The ball carrier will not make a pass if there is no support and the support will not be in position if he thinks a pass will not be made. Even being in position is not enough if the support player is looking to form a ruck and not to receive a pass is enough to make a difference.

Presumably encouraged by their coaching staff and leaders the Hurricanes gave it a go. Confidence built on confidence leading to more passes being made and more passes, in another team a risky pass, were being caught.

The passes were not always easy to catch but the outlook seemed to be “there is no such thing as a poor pass, it is your responsibility to catch it”. It would be interesting to watch a Hurricanes practice to see how this confidence was built.

But in this game there was a flaw. It occurred when the ball was passed to a runner close to the touchline meaning that the only direction for the pass was infield.

Like all teams from phase play the Highlanders’ defence shepherded the attack across the field and there were sufficient numbers to contest the infield pass. I think this happened about 5 times, enough to make a difference.

Who would have thought Julian Savea wouldn’t back his pace and get caught front running when the crucial try could have been scored?

Hurricanes’ Defence

Prior to this game the Hurricanes probably used their defence pattern, I didn’t watch closely enough earlier in the season.

What they did in this game was to have the third and fourth defenders coming forward ahead of the first and second to force the attack to play down the close in channels. The aim, especially from phase play is to turn the attack into their big hitters. Being numerically greater from phase play they had the numbers to even force a turnover and exploit this advantage in the transition between defending and attacking. This is something in which the team that has turned the ball over reacts more quickly than their opponents.

They did this from both phase play and the set pieces and it was a surprise early on to see the Highlanders’ attack have to alter their play as the wide out option was cut off.

The Highlanders have used linear support and the offload in their previous games but it is not as firmly ingrained as it is with the Hurricanes. As a result the less risky option of setting up the ruck and using runners off the ruck led to ball retention. As an aim this is very acceptable if you are ahead.

Only on one occasion did the Highlanders kick the ball into the space behind the defenders who were rushing forward. I have always believed these kicks can result in the defence having to hold their line and not rush.

The Hurricanes were forced to do as was being done to them.

Hurricanes’ Kick–Off Receipts:

It is remarkable how often the team that has just scored plays with the ball in their own half, even their own 22m risking a turnover or the intervention of the ref at each contact situation.

Once again it is something that the Hurricanes have been able to do with encouraging success in their previous games.

But in this game it was different.

Usually kick-offs are for territory and not to regain possession. I don’t know why. Maybe what goes around will come around. Maybe Grant Fox and Ian Foster should mention it to make it fashionable again given their accuracy. I think we have the athletes who would be able to contest the ball.

But let’s get back to the kick off for territory. The Highlanders had a well aligned and numerous chase line. This had to be as numerous as the attack line of the Hurricanes otherwise an overlap could be worked and they would have been gone. But the Highlanders could have numbers because it was unlikely that the Hurricanes would kick for field position.

Equally the Highlanders had a sound receipt line if the Hurricanes kicked the ball. Not only was the line sound from the first return kick but, along with a chaser to put those in front on side, they still had the numbers for a second return kick.

Increasingly the Highlanders played for territory.

Highlanders’ Defence and Tackles:

As I said before the Highlanders did try to reload so they could move into their tackles.

Equally they moved forward without hesitation. Other teams against the Hurricanes felt threatened by their attack and didn’t close down their time and space and were busy working out who was going to tackle whom.

Based on having a more numerous defence line the Highlanders were able to charge forward making up their mind as to who would tackle who as they went. The lack of time and space meant the accuracy of the Hurricanes’ attack was eroded. Numbers meant that there were surplus tacklers and if more than one got involved in the tackle so much the better.

Numbers and low tackles allowed only limited use of the maul. Individually the Hurricanes had a go at the line from close in. Maybe a maul would have done the trick?

The key was having the fitness and motivation to keep it going for as long as possible.

When the Hurricanes did break the line there seemed to be plenty of players coming back in scramble defence. Numbers once again led to success.

Conclusion:

Like all top rugby the difference between the winners and the losers is marginal and hinges on a few things none of which occur on many occasions during a game.

Add to this a disciplined game plan designed to expose the few instances and the ability to maintain pressure ready to exploit the opportunity when it occurs.

The team that didn’t have to go searching for points so long as they were committed to this game plan won the game.

Ref Issues:

1. How long has a team got to perform a quick throw in? So long as they don’t commit two players to the line of touch, how much time have they got?
2. If the ref prevents a contest for the ball post tackle he is diminishing the space the attack has to play.
3. When is a post tackle threat a threat? Where do you have to stand to be deemed involved in the post tackle/ ruck? Are players being taken out, when they are not in the play, to just get rid of someone by flattening them and delaying their entry into the ensuing play?

ALL BLACKS VS MANU SAMOA

 In any game there are standard plays that a team performs so that all team members act in a coordinated way so that there is little hesitation when support for the ball carrier is needed or, in defence, support for the tackler.

All Blacks’ Pattern

In this game, with the potential for temperature induced fatigue being high, the All Blacks played field position rugby and used the pressure from possession and field position, along with patience, to exert pressure on Samoa.

Pressure should lead to points and in this situation the keenness of the Samoan “rush” defence, as well as infringements at the post tackle led to penalties. This is not to say that the All Blacks conceded any more penalties than Samoa but the Samoan ones, as a consequence of the All Back’s attacking pattern, were within kicking range.

This not only allowed them to control the pace of the game but, by taking the kick at goal, the aim was to build a lead and create anxiety in Manu Samoa as they would ultimately have to play catch-up rugby. At the very least the All Blacks would not have to play catch up.

Samoa’s Kick Receipts

What helped came from Samoa’s kick offs after each score. Once the ball was secured with time available for the kicker, the ball was kicked down the near touchline with a strong chase pattern exerting pressure.

This is a standard play and usually one in which the wing on that side of the field and the #8 catch to regain possession of the ball and play options from there.

In this situation the ball was not fielded cleanly and, as the number of “box” kicks continued, Samoa compounded the problem by leaving it to their fullback. This was a miss-match as the chasers were taller and bigger men than the Samoa #15.

The consequence of this was, having scored, the All Blacks, in the first half, had both possession and field position.

All Blacks’ Attack

We now have to ask ourselves why, given this dominance, only one try was scored and the overall number of points quite modest.

Prior to the game the All Blacks would have been aware of the Samoan’s rush defence. I did think that the referee could have been aware of the marginally late tackles on the passer. The commentators did say that it prevented the passer from supporting but injury especially to Carter could well have been a consequence.

The kicking option was used, I think 3 times, and, with a little more height so the ball as dropping on the wing and not moving away from him, the return could have been greater.

I do think that using the boot is a way of making the defence more hesitant. The grubber kick could be used, especially from set pieces when there is not a picket fence of opposing team shins in the stacked defence lines we see from phase play.

But this option was not available because the attack line was standing too flat and received the ball with little way on. As a result the attack was in insufficient motion to threaten the defence. The second reason was that the defence was able to stand close to each other as the attack was standing close.

As a result the defence could come up as a unit and, if the ball carrier could change direction, another defender was close enough to shut things down.

So why didn’t the attack line especially from scrum and line-out stand further apart taking a straight running line, isolating each defender thus creating space for the grubber or evasive running. They may have done this in the hope that they could get the ball beyond defenders to space on the outside. In its execution this didn’t work.

As old fashioned as it is I am beginning to think that what goes around, comes around, and we may see the “extra man” coming out of the shadow of the play maker, as late as possible, into this space to penetrate. Remember John Gallagher who came, not only from behind Warwick or Joe but also from behind Craig Greene or John Kirwan on an outside in line.

I was surprised the reaction, or should I say the action, as the Samoan defence was predictable, was not more effective.

But credit to Samoa they closed down the space and made the attack aware of their presence. More about Samoa’s defence in a moment.

What about the All Blacks attack from phase play?

The pattern is a well versed one now with the forwards being in pods and, once the ball has moved beyond the pod they reload so they can move into the ball as it is passed back. In addition to creating greater numbers around the ball it saved energy. The flaw in this is the assumption that the ball being passed east-west tires the defence out when, all they have to do is do as the attack does and reload so they can move into their tackle when the ball comes back the other way.

In both attack and defence if they don’t reload so they can move into play they lose out as either their running onto the ball or their movement into the tackle lacks momentum.

They could have followed the policy Duncan Laing, that great Varsity “A” rugby and Danion Loader’s swim coach, of “do unto others as they are doing unto you”.

Especially with the Highlanders and Hurricanes and also with the Chiefs, we have seen linear support being used and, what were previously looked on as “50/50” passes, the infamous post game captain’s quote:

“We didn’t make the last pass.”

For some reason these teams delayed the loss of possession at the last pass, sometimes it didn’t occur at all as the ball was placed over the goal line. The reason for this being more successful is the willingness of the support to be “up the ball carrier’s arse” and there in numbers so that the ball carrier could make the pass with confidence and the support would be there in greater and greater numbers because they knew they would be used.

If you have a number of players in the channel and the pass results in a turnover you have players in the line of the ball, the transition from attack to defence should be immediate, and any hope of a counter attack can be snuffed out.

Samoa’s Attack

The Samoan example was more “pick and go” although offloads were made. The key point seemed to be that the immediate Samoan support player, sensing he might have to slow down to catch or pick-up the ball, created space for the next player by driving way threats from the channel of play.

This is the now famous linear support I have been pushing the envelope with for many years. Like a lot of these ideas, I have had to convince myself of their worth to keep pushing given the meagre uptake.

Samoa must take this concept and build on it as it is hard to defend and draws the defence in. If a try is not scored linear support, at the very least, creates lateral space and the ball can be moved wide to that space to continue forward momentum.

The All Blacks had trouble defending this. This is where field position pays off, as too often Samoa had to mount their linear support attack too far from the goal line.

All Blacks’ Defence

I did think that upper body tackles caused the All Blacks to commit more than the tackler and sometimes more than 2 to get the job done. The reason was that the tackle didn’t remove the ball carrier’s legs and he just drove on. If they can rely on the legs being removed by a single defender then the next player can jackal. If the tackler looks on the complete tackle as the tackle plus to his feet and, using the Law that doesn’t require him to come through the gate, also have a go at the ball, the reward could be greater.

Samoa Post Tackle

I remember a well-known Super 15 coach talking to me about Jack Lam. The quote was:

“He doesn’t spin my wheels.”

Well he spins mine as his play, along with Manu 6,8, 12 and 13, jackal to regain possession of the ball. Bloody brilliant. Looking at the build of the team more could join then in this skill. But what was of concern to the All Backs should be Samoa arriving first and being too strong to roll out.

Samoa Defence Options

The Manu defence worked well based on the points I have made earlier but, given the efficiency of their rush defence pattern, is it time for them to try other options to catch the opposition napping.

If the attack becomes so conscious of them they are just catching and passing while drifting side ways, inside out defence can be used to usher them across the field and “gang” tackle the isolated last receiver.

If the attack is conscious of the big hit coming from straight ahead, as it is now, try outside in defence in the same way that Conrad Smith orchestrated the Hurricane’s defence in the Super 12 final. This allows 12 to take the first receiver from his blind side and 13 to take the second receiver from his.

From phase play the 3 options can also be used although you are more likely to get straight running from hit ups so inside out may be less productive.

What you can do from phase play, because defensive numbers often exceed attacking, is allow a straight or outside in defender to leave the line to make the tackle, as others are there to cover if the tackle is missed.

Conclusion

Looking back on the game it was won because possession and field position were conceded by Samoa at the kick-offs and secondly, by an understandable lack of confidence in the early stages of the game by Samoa. By the end of the game they could easily be saying:

“They are not that good.”

“We are pretty good.”

“We wish this was a test series.”

“Semi-finals at the RWC.”

Lastly, know you pattern Samoa and play to it. How you played suits you and you are capable of imposing it on the best. Just do it earlier and keep it going longer.

As far as some members of the All Blacks are concerned, rustiness is not an excuse and don’t look sideways as the Super 15 finalists are arriving and the heat is on.

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